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Drowning in Data: How Managers make Trade-offs between 
Metrics when making Marketing Budgetary Decisions 
 
Abstract 
Despite the proliferation of big data and quantitative information available for marketing 
decisions, surprisingly, we know little about which metrics marketers use for their decisions or 
how marketers make trade-offs between such metrics.  To overcome this gap, in this paper, we 
first propose a model based on over 200 interviews conducted and a multi-disciplinary literature 
review of managerial metric preferences.  Second, we obtain responses from 563 managers with 
authority on over $1 million marketing budgets who selected metrics to include in 1,126 
idealized build-your-own (BYO) conjoint choice marketing budget dashboards, and rank-ordered 
these metrics for 2,252 internal to marketing and external to marketing, approval seeking 
decision tasks.  Finally, we estimate managers’ preferences by proposing a random utility model 
that combines the BYO choice and ranking tasks to correct for selection effects.  Results of our 
analysis, including finding systematic differences in metric utility based on type of marketing 
decision and detecting substantial heterogeneity in preferences among managers, provide an 
understanding of contextual drivers of preferences for metrics and helps establish benchmarks 
based on such preferences.   
Keywords: metrics; managerial decision making; menu-based conjoint analysis; dashboards; 






The digital transformation of business over the last couple of decades has led to an 
unprecedentedly rich information environment for firms to better understand their customers and 
competitors.  For marketing managers, the information-based transformation has resulted in a 
growing number of various metrics that they can now rely on for making their decisions (Farris 
et al. 2010) and an increase in pressure to exhibit accountability and justify their marketing 
decisions via the use of such metrics (Verhoef and Leeflang 2009).  Further, the information-
based transformation has also resulted in marketing managers getting progressively more 
concerned about “metric overload” (e.g., See 2007) and often believing that they are “drowning 
in metrics” while being unsure which specific metrics to employ for their decisions (e.g., Moe 
2014).    
Normative theory suggests that when marketing managers are making their decisions, 
they should use all relevant metrics or information in their decisions to maximize their 
knowledge and to improve decision quality.  Yet, prior research has repeatedly found that people 
are limited by their cognitive resources, so they cannot access all information available and 
instead employ heuristics to simplify their decision making (e.g., Simon 1956).  Further, 
extensive laboratory research has found that decision makers typically do not access all possible 
information due to search costs and information overload (e.g., Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998; 
Jacoby, Chestnut, and Fisher 1978).  In the context of managerial decision making, this implies 
that marketing managers must make trade-offs among metrics they use for making decisions in 
various business contexts (Lehmann and Reibstein 2006).  However, as discussed in the next 
section, academic research and theory has not addressed this metric trade-off issue.  Hence, 
Moorman and Day (2016) advocate for research to understand “how metrics use influences 





trade-offs manifested when marketers use different types of metrics” (p. 20).  Consequently, 
despite its importance to theory and practice, less is known on how managers are making such 
data reduction trade-offs. 
To address this challenge, we propose and implement a novel empirical methodology to 
estimate a behavioral model of managerial preferences and related trade-offs among multiple 
metrics.  Our focus is on how two dimensions, decision type and task, influence managerial 
metric preferences and trade-offs, while also accounting for various characteristics of the 
manager, firm, industry, data quality, and marketing function.  The reason for this foci is 
threefold.  First, for over the past decade, we have conducted more than 200 interviews with 
managers in regards to their metric use,1 and a key message repeatedly expressed was the 
information managers use to make a decision (internally) may differ from the information 
managers use to convince others (e.g., superiors) to get behind that decision (externally).  For 
example, one senior manager from a Fortune 500 company mentioned that “I know what data I 
rely on for making my decisions, it is a different set I need to convince my CFO that we should 
spend the money.”  Thus, we expect managerial preferences for metrics to vary across the 
internal vs. external decision context.  In the managerial accounting literature, this is classified as 
the role in which metrics are being employed to assist (e.g., Demski and Feltham 1976; Sprinkle 
2003).  Yet, this internal vs. external assistance has not been addressed previously in the 
marketing literature. 
Second, based on prior marketing literature and value chain theory (Lehmann and 
Reibstein 2006), we expect metric preferences to vary based on the type of marketing budget 
decision being made.  That is, managerial preferences for different metrics are expected to vary 
                                                          
1 These interviews were conducted by our co-author team with executives, on Measured Thoughts on SiriusXM 





for decisions about pricing versus other critical marketing mix decisions made by marketers such 
as trade promotions or traditional advertising decisions.  Third, literature in data quality (e.g., 
Pipino, Lee, and Wang 2002) and various business disciplines (i.e., marketing, management, 
accounting, information systems, and economics), have identified underlying properties of the 
data and characteristics of the manager, firm, marketing function, and industry as potential 
covariates of managerial metric preferences.   
Consequently, to address how managers are making trade-offs between the metrics 
available to them when making their marketing decisions, we investigate how preferences of 
metrics differ by specific marketing budget decision for internal versus external decision tasks, 
and explore how manager, firm, and industry settings moderate these preferences.  Our empirical 
approach combines an innovative adaptation of conjoint analysis with an idealized design. To 
accomplish this, first, we ask managers to create idealized build-your-own (BYO) (Liechty, 
Ramaswamy, and Cohen 2001) marketing budget dashboards of metrics for two types of 
marketing budget decisions.  Then, we ask the managers to rank-order each of these metrics 
included in their BYO dashboards based on their level of importance for internal and external 
decision tasks.  Finally, we ask the managers to provide information on their firms, industries, 
themselves, and beliefs on the importance of several properties of data quality.    
We collect data from 563 managers with decision authority of >$1 million marketing 
budgets who reported metric inclusion information on 1,126 idealized BYO conjoint choice 
marketing budget dashboards and the rank-orders between the included metrics for 2,252 internal 
to marketing and external to marketing decision tasks.  We build a statistical model that fuses 
this data into a single integrated model in order to estimate managerial metric preferences based 





impact such managerial preferences.  Our results on managerial preferences for (against) metrics 
in certain decision types and tasks, and drivers of such preferences, should improve managerial 
marketing decision making and provide benchmarks to build better marketing dashboards, 
resulting in contributions to practice and theory.  For example, we find satisfaction and total 
customers are the two metrics managers most prefer, while Tobin’s Q and consideration set are 
the two metrics managers least prefer.  Further, we find systematic differences in metric utility 
based on type of marketing decision, such as net profit is more preferred for distribution 
decisions and less preferred for trade promotions.  We also detect substantial heterogeneity in 
preferences among managers, where managers who are more concerned about measurement 
issues tend to prefer metrics that are based on accounting or financial information, such as 
profitability, than metrics that are based on psychometrics, such as customer preferences to the 
brand or product.  In addition, we find that managers who include Tobin’s Q in their idealized 
marketing budget dashboards typically rank the metric highly and those managers from better 
performing firms also have greater preferences for Tobin’s Q, which provides considerable 
contrasts to the negative preferences of Tobin’s Q from the average manager in the sample.  By 
utilizing the full-set of empirical results of managerial preferences for metrics, firms, consultants, 
and academics can create personalized dashboards tailored to firm, industry, and manager 
contexts to improve managerial accountability and decision quality, as discussed in greater detail 
in the Discussion section.  
Background 
Metrics comprise of information that “quantifies a trend, dynamic, or characteristic” (Farris et al. 
2010, p. 1).  They are used as decision aids by managers when making their individual decisions 





Currim 2013).  However, metrics differ in their characteristics, meanings, and limits (Srinivasan 
and Hanssens 2009).  Thus, no “silver bullet” metric has been found that is always best for 
managers to employ for their decisions (Ambler and Roberts 2008).  Instead, it is has been 
recommended that managers employ a portfolio of metrics in order to achieve superior 
performance (Petersen et al. 2009), but it is unknown how managers make trade-offs among the 
metrics they want to include for their marketing budget decisions.   
This lack of knowledge is a surprise given the large number of academic studies 
conducted on managerial information or metric use (summarized in Table 1, which is located 
after the references).  For example, one repeated finding is that the number of metrics managers 
used for their marketing decisions is much smaller than the number of available metrics.  
Further, previous research has identified good reasons for this discrepancy between numbers of 
metrics available and used: gathering such data is costly, looking at too much data is cognitively 
taxing, and managers have limited cognitive resources (e.g., Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998; 
Simon 1956).  This suggests that managers cannot consider or use all relevant information 
available when they make their decisions, but instead must make trade-offs between metrics (or 
information) to use so as not to be overwhelmed (Lehmann and Reibstein 2006).  However, less 
is known on how such trade-offs are made.  
Related Literature 
The conceptual framework proposed in the next section to address this gap is guided by previous 
research in a bevy of domains—consumer behavior and psychology, marketing strategy and 
management, quantitative marketing, managerial accounting, information systems, and statistics.  
In the consumer behavior and psychology fields, there is extensive laboratory research 





costs and information overload constraints (e.g., Jacoby, Chestnut, and Fisher 1978; Malhotra 
1982).  Instead, decision makers typically create consideration sets to screen information into a 
more manageable set of information (Hauser and Wernerfelt 1990; Roberts and Lattin 1991) and 
then must make trade-offs among the information they use since decisions tend to be made based 
on 7 + 2 pieces of information (Miller 1956; Olson and Jacoby 1972).  In a related stream, 
marketing strategy and management research on how managers use information often focuses on 
what causes managers to employ more (less) information in their decisions, and how the use of 
such of information relates to firm performance (e.g., Frösén et al. 2016; Homburg, Artz, and 
Wieseke 2012; Menon et al. 1999).  In addition, other researchers have investigated what drives 
managers to employ certain types of metrics when making their marketing mix decisions (e.g., 
Deshpandé and Zaltman 1982, 1984; Mintz and Currim 2013; Morgan, Anderson, and Mittal 
2005).  However, to our knowledge, no work in these literatures has investigated how managers 
make trade-offs among the multiple individual metrics they employ. 
In the marketing strategy and quantitative marketing literature, value chain theory 
(Lehmann and Reibstein 2006) suggests that because different marketing-mix decisions have 
divergent goals and objectives, the importance of a metric will depend on its alignment between 
the goal of that type of marketing-mix decision and the information provided by the metric 
(Mintz, Gilbride, et al. 2019).  Hence, the type of marketing-mix decision (i.e., advertising, 
pricing, new product development, etc.) has been shown to be an important driver of metric or 
information use (Mintz and Currim 2013; Perkins and Rao 1990).  Previous studies (e.g., Ambler 
2003; Farris et al., 2010) provide normative recommendations for which metrics managers 





empirically test a behavioral model to support these recommendations.  This is something we 
explore. 
In the managerial accounting literature, metrics are often categorized as assisting in a 
decision-facilitating or decision-influencing role (Demski and Feltham 1976; Sprinkle 2003).  
For marketers, this implies that metrics can play differing roles when they are making internal to 
the function decisions in comparison to when they are used to convince others in the 
organization to approve their marketing efforts.  Related, in the information systems literature, 
knowledge management theory has suggested that information that contains unique unit-specific 
measures is often disregarded or not heavily valued by managers when making their decisions 
and performance evaluations (Lipe and Salterio 2000).   
In the data quality and statistics literature (e.g., Hand 1996; Wang and Strong 1996), 
perceptions of the quality of data are often based on its underlying properties such as its 
accuracy, availability, reliability, relevance, and timeliness.  However, managers have also been 
found to have heterogeneous and subjective beliefs on how important each underlying property 
is to their overall preferences of data quality (Pipino, Lee, and Wang 2002).  Thus, while a 
manager’s subjective beliefs about importance of underlying properties are expected to influence 
his/her preferences for certain metrics, it is unknown how much these beliefs drive managerial 
selection, rankings, and trade-offs between metrics in a marketing context. 
Finally, to account for potential covariates that can influence managerial metric 
preferences and trade-offs, we turn to the marketing and management literature where scholars 
posit that a firm’s strategy, decision making, and resource allocation are largely contingent on 
current firm and environmental characteristics (Donaldson 2001).  For example, better-





perform worse (Glazer and Weiss 1993).  Further, characteristics of the (a) manager making the 
decision, i.e., his/her experience and level in the organization (Perkins and Rao 1990); (b) 
marketing function, i.e., its market orientation and importance to the firm (Verhoef and Leeflang 
2009); (c) firm, i.e., size, B2B vs. B2C, and goods vs. service orientation (Mintz and Currim 
2013); and (d) industry, i.e., market concentration and stage of life cycle (Buzzell and Gale 
1987), all could potentially impact which information is considered more important to the 
manager.  
Conceptual Framework 
Based on an iterative process that combined insights garnered from common managerial 
practices, over 200 conducted managerial interviews, and the related literature previously 
discussed, we propose the following conceptual framework (see Figure 1, which is shown after 
the references).  First, based on utility theory, we expect an individual metric to need to cross a 
manager’s utility threshold in order to be considered.  However, because previous research on 
consideration sets suggests that managers have limited cognitive resources and can be 
overwhelmed by information overload, we do not expect all metrics to cross the utility threshold.  
Hence, metrics that are not easily codified and understood by the manager or across the 
organization are less likely to be considered, in line with knowledge management theory.  
Second, based on value chain theory, we expect that the manager’s utility for a given 
metric will be contingent on the type of marketing budget decision.  In other words, the utility 
for a metric and whether it is high enough to cross the threshold to be included for their idealized 
dashboard will differ by the type of marketing budget decision.  Third, for metrics that cross the 
utility threshold, managers are expected to have rankings in terms of their preferences for these 





expected to differ based on whether the task is for facilitating internal decisions (within the 
marketing department) or external decisions (outside the marketing department) that seek 
management’s approval.   
Fourth, based on the data quality and measurement literature, we expect managerial 
beliefs about the importance of underlying measurement properties of metrics to impact the 
baseline utility and preferences for a given metric.  Thus, these managerial beliefs should drive 
the perceived overall importance of metrics and impact the choices, rankings, and trade-offs such 
managers make with individual metrics.  Finally, based on contingency theory, we expect past 
firm and marketing performance, and the characteristics of the manager, firm, marketing 
function, and industry to affect the baseline utility and preferences for a given metric.  In other 
words, we expect these manager, firm, and industry characteristics to moderate the 
aforementioned effects.   
Method 
Data Collection  
The empirical context we use to test our behavioral model are idealized dashboards for the 
common task of marketing budgeting, where managers typically have great uncertainty (Kotler 
and Keller 2012) and the majority of companies claim to not use best practices (Doctorow, 
Hoblit, and Sekhar 2009).  Our empirical data collection involved a seven-step process 
summarized in Table 2 and detailed below (Table 2 is shown after the references).  In the first 
step, managers were asked to indicate which of seven marketing budget decisions, listed in Table 
2, they felt that they had sufficient knowledge about their firm’s current budgeting practices.  
Out of those decisions with perceived sufficient knowledge, managers were then forced to focus 





Decision 1 and Decision 2.  Those who did not feel that they possessed sufficient knowledge 
about at least two different types of budgetary decisions were excluded from the rest of the data 
collection.   
Second, managers participated in a menu-based, BYO choice task, which was 
operationalized by asking the managers to indicate which of the 26 metrics listed in Table 2 they 
would like to include in their idealized dashboard for Decision 1.  Metrics were displayed in a 
randomized order, and managers were informed of the definition of dashboards and provided the 
definitions of each metric via a clickable hyperlink.  After numerous discussions with academics, 
practitioners, and academic-practitioner organizations such as the Marketing Science Institute, 
the total number of metrics included in the study was deemed to be a compromise between not 
overwhelming the participating manager with too many metrics and providing a large enough set 
to include a diverse range of metrics.  The 26 specific individual metrics included in the study 
were selected based on their applicability and generalizability to all seven different marketing 
budgetary tasks and their reported use and perceived importance in 13 previous studies on 
metrics in marketing (Ambler 2003; Ambler, Kokkinaki, and Puntoni 2004; Barwise and Farley 
2004; Du, Kamakura, and Mela 2007; Farris et al. 2010; Hoffman and Fodor 2010; Lehmann and 
Reibstein 2006; Mintz, Currim, et al. 2019; Mintz, Gilbride, et al. 2019; Mintz and Currim 2013, 
2015; Pauwels et al. 2009; Srinivasan, Vanhuele, and Pauwels 2010).  
We employ BYO choice analysis, also called “menu-based conjoint analysis” (Liechty, 
Ramaswamy, and Cohen 2001), for the idealized metric-based dashboard construction because it 
has at least two advantages over a standard, pick-best choice-based conjoint analysis.  The first is 
that, for our marketing budget dashboard context, the BYO choice task better aligns with what 





do not typically select the best dashboard among pre-configured dashboards, as is common with 
consumer products, and would be formulated in a pick-best conjoint choice set, but instead more 
often have flexibility in deciding which metrics should be in or out of their dashboards.  The 
second is that BYO choice tasks are substantially less taxing than pick-best conjoint tasks (e.g., 
Orme 2010).  This is important because when managers and firms are constructing their 
dashboards, they must decide between considerable amounts of metrics available to them.  
Consequently, for our choice task, subjects were asked which of 26 metrics they would like to 
include in their idealized marketing budgetary BYO dashboards, which required subjects to 
answer 26 yes/no questions for each of the two BYO dashboards.  In contrast, a pick-one 
conjoint would require subjects to evaluate at least 30 dashboards on 26 different attributes. 
Third, managers rank-ordered the metrics that were included in their BYO dashboard for 
two different types of scenarios for Decision 1: (i) when the manager or their marketing function 
were making that type of budgetary decision (internal to marketing) and (ii) when the manager or 
their marketing function were seeking top management’s approval for that type of budgetary 
decision (external to marketing).  Via the inclusion of this rank-ordering task, managers were 
forced to make additional trade-offs for chosen metrics for a given decision and task to provide 
additional information on managerial preferences.  Fourth, managers rated the perceived 
accuracy and frequency of use for the individual metrics included in their BYO dashboards. 
Fifth, managers repeated steps 2 through 4 for Decision 2.  
 Sixth, managers rated the level of importance regarding the importance of metrics overall 
based on their availability, reliability, relevance, accuracy, effectiveness, and update frequency.  
A factor analysis indicated a one-factor solution for the perception of data quality’s importance: 





questions regarding managerial, firm, marketing, and industry covariates.  We summarize the 
definitions, measures, and literature sources of the variables in Appendix Table 1. 
Managerial Sample 
To obtain managerial respondents, we collaborated with the market research firm Qualtrics.  
Initial screening of respondents was conducted by Qualtrics to fulfill our requirements: (i) 
managers were required to have decision-making responsibilities for the marketing budget for 
their firms, (ii) work for firms who generated >$1 million in revenues, and (iii) currently hold job 
titles of CEO / owner, CMO, SVP / VP of marketing, director of marketing, or brand / product / 
marketing managers.  Then, for data quality assurance purposes, we included a series of quality 
control checks before, during, and after managers interacted with the choice survey based on 
managerial qualifications, attention checks, analysis for patterned responses, use of multiple 
response scales (nominal, constant sum, Likert scales), and minimum completion times.  Further, 
respondents were only paid for quality submissions, i.e., they needed to pass these 
aforementioned quality control checks, which were unknown to the respondents and helped 
motivate them to be engaged and provide truthful answers.   
Our final dataset contains qualified responses from 563 managers, with 64% of the 
managers categorized as top-level managers in their firm (S/VP or C-level).  Over half the 
managers (58%) work for firms with > 500 full-time employees, and the average manager works 
for a firm that is slightly market oriented (5.74 on a multi-item 1-7 scale, with greater numbers 
indicating more market orientation).  In addition, managers’ indicated that they work nearly 
equally for B2B and B2C (4.28 on a 1-7 scale with B2B = 1 and B2C = 7) and service and goods 
oriented firms (4.42 on a 1-7 scale with services = 1 and goods = 7), and in industries with high 





mature/declining (40%) stages of its life cycle.  However, as indicated by the standard deviations 
in Appendix Table 1, there was also substantial variability within these constructs.   
Model 
Overview. To statistically infer managerial preferences for individual metrics for 
idealized marketing budgeting dashboards, we propose a random utility model that fuses data 
from BYO choice and ranking tasks.  Our unified latent utility model corrects for selection 
endogeneity because managers only rank the metrics that they selected in the BYO task.  The 
integrated model allows for correlation between the BYO and ranking latent utilities and has 
exclusion restrictions to identify the model (Heckman 1979).  Our data fusion model for BYO 
choice and rankings builds on Bacon and Lenk's (2012) model for fusing pick-one conjoint with 
ratings.  However, the data fusion model proposed in this paper requires some care in setting 
identification restrictions and interpreting parameters because the model is invariant to affine 
transformations of the latent utilities for the BYO tasks and ranking tasks.  To overcome this, we 
propose a transformation of parameters to make them invariant to the scaling of the BYO and 
ranking tasks. 
Statistical Model. Figure 2 summarizes our empirical statistical approach (shown after 
references). Subject i first selects two marketing budget decisions, d1 and d2, from a list of D 
decisions described in the previous section. The manager selects the decisions with which he or 
she is most experienced and familiar.  Subjects who were not familiar with two decisions exited 
the experiment.  We treat the decision selection as exogenous to metric preference: managers 
select decision based on business needs and not on their metric preferences.  Second, subject i 





a menu of 26 metrics.  The observed variables in the BYO task are binary, i.e., either manager i 
selects metric m to be included in their dashboard or he or she does not: 
           𝑌0,𝑖,𝑚,𝑑 = {
1 if subject i selects metric m for decision d
0 if metric m is not selected .
 (1) 
The subscript “0” differentiates the BYO exercise and the ranking tasks.  The total number of 
metrics that subject i uses in dashboard d is:  
 𝑛0,𝑖,𝑑 = ∑ 𝑌0,𝑖,𝑚,𝑑.
𝑀
𝑚=1  (2) 
The standard model for BYO tasks is the multivariate probit model (Chib and Greenberg 1998; 
Rao and Winter 1978), which assumes that subject i picks metric m for his or her dashboard if 
the latent utility U0,i,m,d for metric m and marketing budget decision d exceeds zero: 
 𝑈0,𝑖,𝑚,𝑑 > 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑌0,𝑖,𝑚,𝑑 = 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑈0,𝑖,𝑚,𝑑 ≤ 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑌0,𝑖,𝑚,𝑑 = 0  (3) 
Our model for the latent utilities are: 
 𝑈0,𝑖,𝑚,𝑑 = 𝛼0,𝑚,𝑑 + 𝛽0,𝑚
′ 𝑥𝑖 + 𝜀0,𝑖,𝑚,𝑑 (4) 
where the intercept 0,m,d depends on the metric and decision; xi is a vector of covariates for 
subject i; and m is a vector of regression coefficients for metric m.  The covariates account for 
the subject, firm, and industry context and these variables are constant across metrics and 
decisions since managers report on each of these only once.  The random errors 𝜀0,𝑖,𝑚,𝑑 are 
normally distributed with mean 0, variance 1, and correlation 0,m,m*  between metric m and m*.  
This correlation term accounts for unobserved complimentary and substitutability effects if 
subsets of metrics are selected or excluded together.  The error variances are set to one to 
identify the multivariate probit model.   
Third, after the BYO task, subject i completes two ranking tasks for the selected metrics 
in their dashboard.  The rank data are defined as:    





where t is 1 for internal to the marketing function tasks for making the decision, and t is 2 for 
external focused tasks aimed at seeking top management’s approval.  The best metric has rank 1, 
the second best has rank 2, and so on.  Subjects only assign ranks to the metrics that they 
included in the dashboard.  Ties were not allowed.   
 We use an ordinal probit model for the ranking tasks.  The latent utilities for the ranks (t 
= 1 for internal and t = 2 for external) conditional on the BYO latent utilities are: 
 𝑈𝑡,𝑖,𝑚,𝑑 = 𝛼𝑡,𝑚,𝑑 + 𝛽𝑡,𝑚
′ 𝑥𝑖 + 𝜑𝑡
′𝑧𝑡,𝑖,𝑚,𝑑 + 𝜓𝑡,𝑚𝜀0,𝑖,𝑚,𝑑 + 𝜀𝑡,𝑖,𝑚,𝑑 (6) 
where t,m,d is the intercepts for type of ranking, metric, and decision; xi are the covariates in 
Equation (4);tm and t and are vectors of regression coefficients for each ranking task; and 
zt,i,m,d are covariates that are excluded from Equation (4) since the z covariates depend on the 
metrics and ranking tasks while x covariates do not.  In our application, the covariates zt,i,m,d are 
the perceived frequency that the manager uses the metric for the selected decision and the 
perceived accuracy of this metric when making the decision and seeking approval.  The random 
errors t,i,m,d  are mutually independent of each other and the BYO random errors and are 
normally distributed with mean 0 and standard deviation t,m.   
State dependence or carryover from the BYO task to the rating task is captured by the 
parameter t,m for ranking tasks t = 1 and 2 and metric m.  This carryover parameter captures the 
correlation between the error terms of the BYO task and rankings, and along with the exclusion 
restrictions, is important in correcting for selection bias (Heckman 1979).  For example, if the 
estimated t,m are non-zero, which they are with our data, then endogeneity exists due to 
selection effects.  An alternative specification would be to correlate all of the error terms in the 
BYO and ranking tasks, which would result in an undesirable 3,003 (78*77/2) correlations 





 Latent utility models for rankings assume that the ordering of the latent utilities 
correspond to the ordering of the ranks.  Our study has an additional complexity: subjects only 
rank the metrics that they selected for their dashboards, so they rank a different number of 
metrics.  Consequently, without further restrictions, the latent utility scales would differ among 
subjects depending on how many metrics that they selected.  For instance, if subject A selects 3 
metrics and subject B selects 10 metrics, then the estimated utilities for subject A and B’s second 
best ranked metric would be much different.  To make the utility scales comparable between 
subjects, we use a cut-point model:  
 
𝑈𝑡,𝑖,𝑚,𝑑 > 𝜒𝑀−1 if 𝑌𝑡,𝑖,𝑚,𝑑 = 1 and 𝑌0,𝑖,𝑚,𝑑 = 1 
𝜒𝑀−𝑟 < 𝑈𝑡,𝑖,𝑚,𝑑 ≤ 𝜒𝑀−𝑟+1 if 𝑌𝑡,𝑖,𝑚,𝑑 = 𝑟 and 𝑌0,𝑖,𝑚,𝑑 = 1
𝑈𝑡,𝑖,𝑀,𝑑 ≤ 𝜒1 if 𝑌𝑡,𝑖,𝑚,𝑑 = 𝑀 and 𝑌0,𝑖,𝑚,𝑑 = 1
 (7) 
where the cut-points are ordered 1 < … <  M-1.  Note that the ordering of the ranks (1 is best, 
and 2 is second best) is reversed of the ordering of the latent utilities (utility for best is bigger 
than the utility for second best).  If subject i selected less than M metrics in the BYO task (i.e., all 
the metrics), we do not know how he or she would rank the metrics that were not selected.  Thus, 
if the number of metrics n0,i,d that were selected by subject i is less than M, then the ordinal 
probit model for the unranked metrics is assumed to be less than the cut-point for worst-ranked 
metric: 
 𝑈𝑡,𝑖,𝑚,𝑑 ≤ 𝜒𝑀−𝑛0,𝑖,𝑑 if  𝑌0,𝑖,𝑚,𝑑 = 0.   (8) 
For the metrics that were not selected, we use multiple imputation within each iteration of the 
MCMC (Little and Rubin 2002).  Finally, since we estimate the intercept and error standard 
deviation, we need to fix two of the cut-points to identify the model.  We fix the first and last 
cut-points to -3 and 3 so that the scale of the utilities from the rank data will be roughly 





Because the data fusion model combines BYO utilities with rank utilities, the choice of 
fixed cut-points can lead to substantive differences in the results by shifting the means and 
variances of the latent utilities for the probit models.  Some of these differences are easy to 
reconcile: increasing the spread in the fixed cut-points by a factor of 10 tends to increase the 
error standard deviations and the carryover parameter  by a factor of 10, and adding a constant 
to the fixed cut-points shifts the intercepts in the ordinal probit model.  For some other results, 
such as comparing intercepts, parsing out the effect of the identifying constraints is more 
difficult.  To make the results robust to identification constraints, we standardize the intercepts 
by dividing the intercepts by the standard deviation t,m of the random error and then mean 
centering by an ANOVA decomposition.  We transform the intercepts into main effects and 
interactions in a 3-way ANOVA with 26 levels for metric, 7 levels for marketing decision, and 3 
levels for task: 
t,m,d /t,m,= Grand Mean + Metric Main Effect + Decision Main Effect  
         + Task Main Effect  + Metric*Decision Interaction  
         + Metric*Task Interaction + Decision*Task Interaction  
         + Metric*Decision*Task Interaction 
 
(9) 
where the main effects and interactions sum to zero.  The Appendix provides further details and 
presents a robustness study to verify this method.       
Equations (4) and (6) imply a structured covariance for the random error terms: 
[
Σ0 Σ0Ψ1 Σ0Ψ2
Ψ1Σ0 Σ1 + Ψ1Σ0Ψ1 Ψ1Σ0Ψ2
Ψ2Σ0 Ψ2Σ0Ψ1 Σ2 + Ψ2Σ0Ψ2
] 
where t and t for t = 1 and 2 are M x M diagonal matrices with t,m and t,m,m on the diagonals. 
The model adjusts for selection effects by excluding the covariates xi from the random utility for 
the ranking tasks in Equation (6) and by including a correlation structure among the selection 





Doucet, and Murphy (2012) method for generating correlation matrices for multivariate probit 
and Lenk and Orme (2009) conditional normal model.  
Results 
Descriptive Statistics on Metrics 
The 563 marketing managers in the BYO experiment generated 1,126 dashboards: two 
dashboards per subject for different marketing decisions.  The most frequently reported idealized 
marketing budget dashboards, as reported in Figure 3, Panel A (shown after the references), were 
for digital (277 dashboards) and traditional advertising decisions (202 dashboards).  Respondents 
included an average of 5.8 metrics per dashboard across all marketing decisions, and dashboards 
ranged in total metric use from one metric to all 26.  There is some variation in the number of 
metrics per dashboard by marketing decision, ranging from an average 5.1 metrics for trade 
promotions to an average of 6.2 metrics for new product development (NPD) (Figure 3, Panel B; 
shown after the references).  However, we do not find significant differences in the number of 
metrics included in BYO dashboards across types of decisions (p=.25 in a one-way ANOVA).    
In Table 3 (shown after the references), we report, overall and by type of marketing 
budget decision, on each metric’s percent of inclusion in BYO dashboards, average rankings for 
internal and external decision tasks, and rankings in comparison to the other metrics for both the 
percent inclusion in BYO dashboards and average rankings for internal and external tasks.  In 
Figure 4 (shown after the references), we graph the metrics’ proportion of inclusion in BYO 
dashboards for easier interpretability.  The five individual metrics most frequently included in 
the BYO dashboards were satisfaction (34%), return on investment (ROI) (33%), net profit 
(32%), loyalty (30%), and total customers (29%).  The five metrics least often included in BYO 





present value (NPV) (14%), and share of voice (15%).  From the metrics that were included in 
BYO dashboards, we asked the respondents to rank their chosen metrics in terms of importance 
for internal and for external use.  For internal decision tasks, the five metrics ranked the highest 
by managers were (in order) ROI, net profit, satisfaction, return on marketing investment 
(ROMI), and return on sales (ROS).  For external decision tasks, the five metrics ranked the 
highest were ROI, net profit, ROS, ROMI, and likeability.  For many metrics, we find 
similarities in their internal and external average rankings; however, some differences exist 
between internal and external tasks when looking at the metrics average ranking compared to 
others.  For example, we find stock returns are ranked near the bottom of average-ranked metrics 
for internal tasks (ranked 21st), but closer to the top for external tasks (ranked 9th), and Tobin’s Q 
is ranked high for internal tasks (ranked 6th), but ranked lower for external tasks (ranked 13th).     
Our central expectation is that respondents’ desired metrics should differ by decision and 
by decision tasks.  A logistic regression model for selecting metrics into idealized dashboards 
tests if the differences are significant and confirms our central premise that metric utility varies 
by marketing decision.  The main effects for metric, decision, and their interactions are highly 
significant (p<.01).  Further, when examining the full-set of descriptive statistics in Table 3, we 
find several model-free differences existed, as we had hypothesized.  For example, one of the 
biggest differences was with the measure “share of wallet.”  It is one of the least included metrics 
in BYO dashboards for traditional advertising (ranked 24th), digital advertising (ranked 20th), and 
new product development (ranked 24th) decisions, but it is included relatively more often than 
other metrics for trade promotion (ranked 14th).  In addition, share of wallet is ranked relatively 
lower than other metrics when managers are making new product development decisions for 





advertising decisions, share of wallet is ranked higher than other metrics for internal tasks 
(ranked 5th) and ranked lower than other metrics for external tasks (ranked 21st).   
Hence, to meaningfully examine the differences in managerial preferences for metrics, 
we need to look across many of the different variants—type of decision, internal vs. external 
decisions, and by company and industry covariates.  Consequently, the model-free descriptive 
statistics report demonstrates the need for the theory-based empirical model detailed in previous 
sub-sections that inter-connects how these relationships can affect managerial choices, rankings, 
and trade-offs between metrics.  
Model Results 
We estimated the model with Markov chain Monte Carlo and use “Bayesian p-values” to test if a 
coefficient is significant.  In line with Bayesian estimation, we identify a coefficientas 
significant at the 0.05 level if 97.5% of its posterior distribution is above 0 or 97.5% is below 0.  
Positive (negative) main effects indicate that the metric utilities in Equations (4) and (6) are 
larger (smaller), all else held constant; hence, these metrics are more (less) likely to be included 
in the BYO idealized marketing budget dashboard task or ranked higher (lower) in the ranking 
tasks.   
Table 4 (shown after the references) displays the grand mean (upper-left cell of results), 
main effects for metric (first column of results), main effects for decision (first row of results), 
and interactions between metric and decision (second-eighth columns of results) from the three-
way ANOVA decomposition in Equation (9), after scaling the standard deviation of the error 
terms.  In Figure 5 (shown after the references), we rank-order the main effects for metrics based 
on their preference weights.  We find ten metrics have significant, positive main effects, with 





have significant, negative main effects, with managers’ least preferring Tobin’s Q, consideration 
set, and NPS.  Interestingly, we find the metrics significantly preferred by managers are a 
mixture of non-financial or marketing (satisfaction, total customers, market share, loyalty, and 
retention rate) and financial metrics (ROS, target volume, net profit, ROI, and ROMI).  This 
provides some evidence reinforcing current efforts on making firms more customer-centric, and 
also reflects current trends and demands that marketing needs to be more financially-oriented.  
We consider possible explanations and implications in the Discussion section. 
Next, we report on the interactions between metrics and type of marketing budget 
decisions.  We find 35 significant interactions out of 182 interaction terms: 23 positive and 12 
negative.  The positive (negative) interactions indicate that these metrics are more (less) 
preferred for a certain type of budgeting decision in comparison to their overall preferences to 
the metric and decision.  For instance, we find net profit, which has a positive and significant 
main effect, has positive and significant interaction effects with pricing, new product 
development, and distribution decisions, indicating managers have greater preferences for net 
profit in these types of budgetary decisions.  However, we also find that net profit has a 
significant and negative interaction with trade promotions, indicating managers have worse 
preferences for net profit in trade promotion budgetary decisions.  In contrast, we find that NPS, 
which has a negative and significant main effect, has positive and significant interaction effects 
with traditional advertising and customer and trade promotions.  Consequently, we find that 
although NPS is less preferred overall, it is more valued by managers making these three types of 
decisions.  Based on the interactions, we can also examine which metrics are more or less 
preferred for a type of marketing budget decision.  For example, we find that managers who 





of voice, but also negative, significant preferences for customer lifetime value (CLV), economic 
value added (EVA), and perceived quality of the product or brand.  While we believe the 
interaction findings are important, due to space reasons, we refer the reader to Table 4 for more 
in-depth analysis of the results.2 
Table 5 (shown after the references) displays the estimated coefficients t,m for the 
managerial, firm, industry, marketing function, and data quality covariates in Equations (4) and 
(6).  We find that managers who value measurement properties (Importance of Measurement) 
significantly prefer financial metrics such as ROMI, NPV, EVA, and CLV (first column of 
results in Table 5), which are metrics typically computed from enterprise resource management 
software and accounting databases, and not based on consumers perceptions obtained from 
surveys or other methods.  In addition, managers who value measurement properties of metrics 
also significantly prefer satisfaction, quality, and retention among the marketing metrics, which 
are marketing metrics with more established measurement properties.  Further, we find managers 
who value measurement properties tend to prefer financial metrics like ROI and ROS for their 
internal and external tasks, over marketing metrics such as likeability and preference for the 
brand or service (second and third column of results in Table 5).  Consequently, we find that 
when ROI and ROS (likeability and preference) are included in BYO budgetary dashboards, they 
                                                          
2 For the main effects by type of decision, we only find distribution to be significant and negative, which implies that 
dashboards for distribution decisions tend have fewer metrics than other decisions. Other types of decisions were 
insignificant. The main effects for type of task (BYO and ranking internal and external) are significant, but not 
substantively meaningful since they are artifacts of the identification of the ordinal probit model.  In the Appendix, 
we discuss this in more detail.  The only significant interaction between type of task and decision is between digital 
advertisement and BYO, indicating that managers making digital advertisements are significantly more likely to 
include more metrics in their BYO dashboard.  The remaining interactions between type of task and decision are 
insignificant, as are the two-way interactions between metric and task, and the three-way interactions between type 
of task, metric, and decision.  Hence, we do not report them here but the complete tables are available from the 





tend to be enhanced (downgraded) in the ranking tasks by managers who value solid 
measurements.  
Next, we examine which metrics are valued the most by managers working in better 
performing firms and marketing functions.  We find two significant positive coefficients for 
utilities in the BYO task: Tobin’s Q for Recent Business Performance and share of wallet for 
Recent Market Performance.  This reveals an interesting contrast: while Tobin’s Q is found to be 
the managers’ least preferred metric overall, at the same time, it has the most positive interaction 
with better performing firms.  We come back to this result in the Discussion section.  Further, we 
find that managers working in better performing marketing functions significantly prefer market 
share and customer segment profitability for internal tasks, but not external tasks, and that these 
managers prefer EVA and branding expenditures for external tasks, but not internal tasks. 
For the remainder of our manager, firm, and industry covariates, we note that many of 
these covariates are significant, indicating their importance to be included in our conceptual and 
empirical models.  For example, we find that (i) satisfaction, quality, and preference are valued 
greater in market oriented firms, (ii) ROMI is valued greater in firms where marketing has 
greater perceived importance to the firm; and (iii) NPS is valued greater in larger firms but less 
so in smaller firms.  However, since we consider these manager, firm, and industry 
characteristics as controls, and there are too many covariates to go into details about every 
characteristic, we refer the reader to Table 5 for further analysis.   
The latent utilities of internal and external decisions in Equation (6) have covariates that 
are excluded from the BYO utilities in Equation (4).  Subjects rated metrics included in their 
idealized BYO dashboards for how frequently they used the metric for this type of budgetary 





frequently used by managers tended to be ranked significantly higher in the ranking tasks 
(p<.05), but the metric’s perceived accuracy did not impact the rankings (p>.05).  Based on our 
previously discussed findings that managers who value measurement properties tend to select 
different metrics, we believe this result may occur because managers are less likely to select 
metrics for their idealized BYO dashboards that they consider to be inaccurate, so all metrics 
selected for their dashboards pass some subjective threshold of accuracy.  However, this result 
may also occur simply because managers care less about metric accuracy when selecting metrics 
for their idealized BYO dashboards. 
In terms of the relationship between the BYO and ranking tasks utilities, we detect 
considerable carryover or state dependencet,m in Equation (6).  The coefficients of t,m are all 
significantly different from zero (p<.05) and range between 1.21 and 1.98 with a median of 1.60.  
These results are not surprising as we would expect some similarity between managerial 
preferences for metrics in the BYO idealized dashboard tasks and how they subsequently ranked 
them for the two decision tasks.  However, these results demonstrate the need to incorporate 
these carryover effects when modeling the ranking task utilities to avoid bias due to selection 
effects.  The carryover for internal and external decisions are broadly similar to each.  The ratios 
of the carryover for external to internal range between 0.88 and 1.11 with a median of 0.99.  
Combining this result and the lack of significant differences reported in Table 5 between 
preferences for metrics in internal vs. external decision tasks, suggests that managers do not 
appear to significantly rank metrics differently for their internal and external tasks.    
Finally, we examine the correlations between expected utilities from the BYO dashboard 
task to assess whether metrics were selected in some type of substitutability or complimentary 





they ranged between -0.03 and 0.09, which indicates that after adjusting for their expected 
utilities, subjects did not consistently select metrics in groups of substitutes or compliments.3  In 
other words, we find no distinctive pattern of how managers selected certain groups to be 
included in their idealized dashboards.  This could be a result caused by a heterogeneous set of 
managers that cannot be captured by the covariates included in our study or simply that 
managers prefer to use their own portfolios of metrics tailored for their own manager, firm, and 
industry contexts.   
Discussion 
In this research, we develop a novel framework and empirical methodology to infer managerial 
preferences of metrics based on the selections, rankings, and trade-offs managers make when 
making their marketing budgetary decisions, and estimate such preferences using a large-scale 
managerial sample collected via surveys.  Based on insights garnered from over 200 managerial 
interviews and a broad, multi-disciplinary literature review, we posit that managerial preference 
weights for metrics are a function of the type of marketing budgetary decision, the internal and 
external to marketing decision task, managerial perception of importance of data quality 
measurement, and characteristics of the manager, marketing function, firm, and industry.  Our 
empirical results provide support for the proposed behavioral model and contributes to marketing 
theory by identifying broad drivers of managerial preferences for metrics by type of marketing 
decisions.  
Consistent with our initial premise, we find managerial metric preferences do indeed 
depend on the specific marketing decisions being made, as reported in Table 4.  However, we 
find less empirical support for our second premise expecting managers to value metrics 
                                                          





differently for internal versus external decision tasks.  We also find that managers who place a 
greater importance on underlying data quality issues, tend to broadly prefer financial metrics 
over marketing metrics, and that characteristics of the manager, firm, and industry are all 
important aspects for marketing dashboards.  Hence, our broad-level empirical results indicate 
that marketing dashboards need to be flexible and adapt to the decision, task, and managerial, 
firm, and industry characteristics at hand. 
The method employed to analyze this behavioral model contributes methodologically by 
combining a BYO, menu-based choice task and subsequent rankings of those metrics included 
across a number of different types of decisions while accounting for a wide range of covariates.  
This combination of research methodologies allows us to combine stated and latent revealed 
managerial preferences from forced trade-off scenarios, which we believe will be useful for 
future market research.  For example, our methodology would be useful for car manufacturers to 
try to better understand their consumers’ preferences for a variety of potential car attributes, in 
which our method would provide more in-depth and realistic analysis.  For instance, the 
attributes that consumers’ value differ among use condition, such as commuting, road trips, and 
weekend adventures in nature.  Similarly, hotel/resort attributes are differently valued for family 
stays versus romantic getaways.  Our methodology is most appropriate when subjects are forced 
with a menu choice for a product or service, and the contingencies of the consumption 
experience is not uniform.   
While the main focus of this research is on the underlying framework and novel 
methodology proposed to infer managerial preferences of metrics, our empirical results based on 
563 managers describing 1,126 marketing budgeting decisions and 2,252 internal and external 





we provide descriptive statistics that capture current trends of which metrics are most likely to be 
included in idealized marketing BYO dashboards across a number of decisions and what are the 
rank-order of these metrics when managers are making internal and external to the marketing 
function tasks.  For example, we find satisfaction is the metric most likely to be included in an 
idealized dashboard, and ROI is the metric most likely to be highest ranked for both internal and 
external tasks.  In addition, we find that some metrics like net profit are consistently among the 
three highest-ranked metrics, while share of voice and consideration set are consistently among 
the five lowest-ranked metrics.  Other metrics like loyalty have a high likelihood to be included 
in budgetary BYO dashboards, but have a moderate ranking for the internal and external decision 
tasks, indicating that managers prefer these metrics to be included in their budgetary dashboards 
but are less likely to rely on them for their internal or external decision tasks.   
Second, our results suggest that managers have the greatest preferences or utilities for 
satisfaction, total customers, and ROS, and least preferences for Tobin’s Q, consideration sets, 
and NPS.  Our finding of satisfaction as the most popular measure employed by managers is 
consistent with previous research (e.g., Mintz, Currim, et al. 2019).  However, finding lower 
overall managerial preferences for NPS it was a bit surprising to, especially given the amount of 
attention it has received over the last twenty years and that it is regularly touted as a superior 
metric to satisfaction (e.g., Stauffer 2019).  Consequently, it appears that the message of NPS 
touted as a superior metric has not been widely heard and/or accepted.  In addition, when looking 
at the lowest preferred metrics, interestingly, it appears that marketers’ attention seems to focus 
on the metrics they believe they can directly affect and not so grandiose to follow all the way to 





Third, we find that managers who perceive data quality as an important quality of 
metrics, tend to broadly prefer financial metrics over marketing metrics.  A possible reason for 
this result is that financial metrics are more widely accepted and employed by managers across 
the organization, so there is less uncertainty in the information that these metrics are supposed to 
convey.  In addition, managers may be more uncertain of the information that marketing metrics 
convey, or less trusting of their potential impact, which lead managers with greater preference 
for data quality to value these marketing metrics less.  These preferences for financial metrics by 
managers who are more concerned about measurement issues provides support for the marketing 
field’s push for marketers to tie reasons for their marketing decisions with financial metrics (e.g., 
Magill, Moorman, and Avdiushko 2019).  Further, it was quite clear in our analysis that 
marketing managers are using and need to use financial metrics for their decisions (ROI, ROMI, 
Net Profit, and ROS).  
Finally, we find that managers in better-performing organizations value Tobin’s Q and 
share of wallet significantly greater than other metrics, which offers some best-practices based 
normative takeaways.  This demonstrates that if we as academics believe that these are the right 
metrics for managers to employ for their marketing decisions, we need to continue promoting 
and making a better case for managers to use them.  For Tobin’s Q, we find less managerial 
preference for this metric because it is the least likely metric to be included by managers in an 
idealized BYO dashboard.  Yet, it is also one of two metrics significantly more preferred by 
managers working in better performing organizations, and it has a very high ranking for internal 
decision tasks especially in comparison to its likelihood of being included in the BYO 
dashboards.  Hence, it appears that those few managers who do employ it their idealized BYO 





the academic literature, it is less understood and/or accepted in practice.  Instead, there appears to 
be much work to gain its acceptance by the majority of managers making marketing budget 
decisions, as there does appear to be some type of normative value placed on it by managers. 
Overall, the empirical findings presented in our research should be useful for dashboard 
construct in the future since they are based on managerial preferences to metrics in idealized 
marketing budget dashboard situations, and hence provide normative preferences for which 
metrics managers most and least prefer.  Further, our empirical analysis is one of the first to 
employ conjoint analysis to infer marketing managers’ preferences.  As marketers have 
consistently stated that less is known on marketing manager behavior (Goldfarb et al. 2012; 
Wierenga, Van Bruggen, and Staelin 1999), our empirical and statistical strategy can provide a 
guide for how such studies on managerial behavior can be conducted.  However, a caveat to our 
research that enables future research opportunities is that our results could be a function of the 
sample of managers that we obtained for the data collection.  While every effort was made to 
obtain a wide range of managers who were tasked with marketing budget decisions in their firms, 
our sample of managers based on a Qualtrics panel may not be representative of the managerial 
population as a whole.  In addition, our focus was on managers working in larger firms, i.e., 
>$1million in revenues, but it would be interesting to compare the results of our analysis with 
managers working in smaller firms.  Future research should also compare and contrast metric 
preferences for non-budgetary and budgetary decisions.  This could provide insights into how 
metric preferences could vary between more routine and more in-depth, consequential decisions.  
Future work should also investigate group decision-making settings rather than focusing on the 
individual.  Finally, our research examines managerial preferences of marketing metrics when 





implemented.  Future research should examine ex-post performance evaluations.  We hope 
research will expand on these promising endeavors to relieve managers feeling they are 
“drowning in metrics.”  While, we do not anticipate that the “sea of metrics” will evaporate to a 
more manageable puddle given ever-expanding information technology, we do hope our research 







A challenge of combining the BYO and ranking data for the dashboards is that the utilities for 
the different tasks need not have the same scale, depending on how the models are identified.  
Then apparent differences between the models may be an artifact of the scaling methods and not 
reflective of the managers’ underlying preferences.  The utilities for probit models are not 
identified because linear transformations give equivalent probability models.  For instance, if the 
random utility U has mean  and standard deviation , then U* = a + bU has mean * = a + b 
and standard deviation * = b for constants a and b where b is positive.  Then U and U* have 
the same ordering.  The utilities for the BYO conjoint are identified by setting the no-choice 
utility to zero and the variances to one.  One way to identify the ordinal probit model is to fix the 
first and last cut-points, which determines the location and scale of the latent utilities.  Changing 
these fixed cut-points is equivalent to a linear transformation of the rank utilities.  Because the 
model combines BYO utilities with rank utilities, the choice of fixed cut-points can lead to 
substantive differences in the results by shifting the means and variances of the latent utilities for 
the probit model. Some of these differences are easy to reconcile: increasing the spread in the 
fixed cut-points by a factor of 10 tends to increase the error standard deviations and the carryover 
parameter  by a factor of 10, and adding a constant to the fixed cut-points shifts the intercepts.  
Other results, such as comparing coefficients across BYO and rank tasks, are more difficult to 
parse out the effect of the identifying constraints.   In reporting the results, we divide the 
intercepts by the error standard deviation and mean-center them so that they are invariant to 
linear transformations.  Because we do not compare regression coefficients  and  from the 





We performed a small study to illustrate the impact of the fixed cut-points on the 
intercepts using the survey data.  Appendix Table 2 shows the root mean square error (RMSE) 
between estimated parameters for four different assumptions about the fixed points for the 
ordinal probit model.  Model 1 sets the fixed cut-points to -3 and 3.  With these fixed cut-points 
the scale of the utilities from the rank data will be roughly equivalent to that of the BYO utilities, 
which has error standard deviation of one.  Models 2 and 3 increase the overall mean and 
standard deviation by setting the first cut-point to one and the last cut-point to 10 or 100.  Model 
4 compresses the standard deviation by setting the cut-points to zero and one.  We see that the 
RMSE between the raw intercepts for different models is large compared to that of the mean-
centered and scaled estimates.  Model 4, which constrains 24 metrics between zero and one, 
deserves special attention.  It forces the rank utilities to have a small error variance.  The 
posterior variance of the scaled estimates was unexpectedly large after dividing by small, error 
standard deviations.  This increase in posterior variance made it more difficult to compare 
parameters with confidence.  In the following analysis, we use Model 1 where the fixed cut-
points are +3 because the rank utilities have a similar scale to the BYO utilities. 
In our analysis of the experiment the main effects for the type of task are significant 
(p<0.05) but not substantively meaningful.  The main effects are -0.823 for BYO, 0.403 for 
Internal and 0.420 for External.  The negative main effect for BYO means that metrics have less 
than a 50% chance of selection into a dashboard on average.  The difference between BYO and 
the ranking tasks are determined by the selection of fixed cut-points (+3) for the ordinal probit 
model and are not meaningful.  The main effects for Internal and External are essentially equal 
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Figure 1. Conceptual Model 
 
  
Managers have baseline utilities and 
consideration sets of metrics 
Managerial preferences for metrics in a 
decision vary based on internal and 
external decision tasks 
Utility & Knowledge Management Theories:  
 A metric needs to cross a manager’s utility threshold to be 
included  
 A metric is less likely considered if not easily codified or 
understood across the organization 
Managerial preferences of metrics are 
moderated by characteristics of 
managers, firms, marketing functions, 
industries, and individual perceptions of 
data quality 
Value Chain Theory:  
 A manager’s preference for a metric will be contingent on the 
type of marketing budget decision 
 
Managerial preferences for metrics vary 
based on the type of marketing budget 
decision 
Role of Metrics based on Managerial Accounting Literature:  
 A manager’s preference for a metric for a given type of 
marketing budget decision should vary based on whether 
metric is used for facilitating and making decisions within a 
function (internal) or seeking approval for such decisions 
(external) 
Contingency Theory:  
 Characteristics of the manager, firm, marketing function, and 
industry, and individual perceptions of data quality should 















Figure 3. Summary Statistics on Dashboards by Type of Marketing Budget Decision 
 





















































































Abramson et al. 
(2005) 
Aggregate    
Examines whether additional 
information and decision aids improve 
marketing-mix decision outcomes 
Ambler (2003) Individual √   
Suggests different individual metrics to 
employ for different types of decisions 
Ambler et al. 
(2004) 
Individual    





Aggregate    
Examines drivers and outcomes of 




Individual    
Reports how often six metrics are 




Aggregate    
Examines when managers are more 




Aggregate    
Examines what affects market research 
suppliers’ perceptions of managerial 
use of their information 
Farris et al. 
(2010) 
Individual √   
Suggests different metrics to employ 
for different types of decisions 
Frösén et al. 
(2016) 
Aggregate    
Investigates how interactions among 
market orientation, marketing 
performance measurement systems, 
and firm size affect firm profits 
Gebhardt et al. 
(2019) 
Aggregate    
Finds that creation, existence, or 
absence of organizationally shared 
schemes influence firms’ market 
intelligence dissemination practices 
Glazer et al. 
(1992) 
Aggregate    
Investigates whether providing 
additional information for decision 
making helps performance 
Glazer and 
Weiss (1993) 
Aggregate    
Examines how industry turbulence may 
influence amount of information used 
and associated performance  
Homburg et al. 
(2012) 
Aggregate    
Examines the impact of interactions 
among marketing performance 
measurement systems, the firm, and 
the industry on firm performance  
Hult et al. 
(2017) 
Individual    
Investigates whether managers’ 
perceptions of drivers of customers’ 
satisfaction and loyalty align with 
actual customers 
Lee et al. 
(1987) 
Aggregate    
Identifies conditions that make 
managers more likely to use market 








Aggregate √   
Provides guidance for metrics selection 




Aggregate    
Develops conceptual model to untangle 
how environment, task, firm, and 
manager characteristics influence 
knowledge utilization 
Menon et al. 
(1999) 
Aggregate    
Examines the impact of firm resources 
and culture on information use for 




Aggregate √   Identifies drivers of overall metric use 
Mintz and 
Currim (2015) 
Aggregate √   
Investigates the role of total metric use 
in marketing-mix performance 
Mintz et al. 
(2019a) 
Individual √   
Investigates which individual metrics 
are associated with better performance 
when employed for different types of 
marketing-mix decisions 
Mintz et al. 
(2019b) 
Aggregate √   
Examines how national and 




Aggregate    
Discusses how organizational culture 
may affect available and used 
information 
Morgan et al. 
(2005) 
Individual    
Uncovers antecedents of the use of 
customer satisfaction data 
O’Sullivan and 
Abela (2007) 
Aggregate    
Investigates how the ability to measure 
metrics may influence firm 
performance 
Perkins and Rao 
(1990) 
Aggregate √   
Examines the impact of managerial 
experience on information use 
Sinkula (1994) Aggregate    
Develops conceptual model to uncover 
how organizations process market 
information 
Sinkula et al. 
(1997) 
Aggregate    
 Investigates the impact of 
organizational learning on 




Individual    
Develops conceptual framework 
designed to guide firms to manage 
customers by using four key metrics 
This Paper Individual  √ √ √ 
Examines how marketers make trade-
offs between metrics for different types 






Table 2. Data Collection Procedure and Example 
Step Description Example 
1 Select 2 of 7 marketing budgetary decisions 
with which you have had experience (if 
have experience with more than 2 decisions, 











2 For Decision 1, indicate which of 26 metrics 
you would like to include in your idealized 
dashboard 
 
Consumer Promotions Dashboard Metrics 
Acquisition Cost Quality 
Awareness Retention 




Likeability Segment Profit 
Loyalty Share of Voice 
Market Share Share of Wallet 
Net Profit Stocks 
Net Prom Score Target Volume 
NPV Tobin’s Q 
Preference Total Customers 
3 For Decision 1, rank-order the included 
metrics for your dashboard when making 




1 Awareness  
2 Likeability  
3 ROI 
4 Share of Voice 
5 Market Share 
6 Net Profit 
4 For Decision 1, rank-order the included 
metrics for your dashboard when seeking 




2 Market Share 
3 Awareness 
4 Net Profit  
5 Likeability  
6 Share of Voice 
5 For Decision 1, rate the accuracy and 










Awareness    
Likeability    
Market Share   
Net Profit    
ROI   
Share of Voice   
6 Repeat steps 2-5 for Decision 2 Repeat steps 2-5 for Traditional Advertising Decision 
7 Questions on manager, firm, marketing 
function, industry, and perceptions of data 
quality 






Table 3. Detailed Information on Metrics per Type of Marketing Budget Decision 
Type of 
Decision Consumer Promotions Digital Advertising Distribution New Product Development 
Type of Task BYO Internal External BYO Internal External BYO Internal External BYO Internal External 
Metric % Rank Ave Rank Ave Rank % Rank Ave Rank Ave Rank % Rank Ave Rank Ave Rank % Rank Ave Rank Ave Rank 
Acquisition Cost 0.21 16 4.58 17 4.55 16 0.29 7 4.54 6 4.47 4 0.19 16 4.17 6 4.75 11 0.26 10 5.41 23 5.49 21 
Awareness 0.26 5 3.95 9 4.59 17 0.32 3 4.94 14 5.08 13 0.28 8 5.39 21 4.56 8 0.24 14 4.87 15 4.83 16 
Brand. Expend. 0.22 15 4.97 21 5.06 22 0.25 14 4.87 12 4.93 11 0.22 13 4.43 11 5.43 17 0.24 13 4.91 16 4.89 17 
CLV 0.23 10 3.89 8 3.86 8 0.18 19 5.63 21 5.80 23 0.22 13 4.86 16 5.86 23 0.23 15 4.56 11 4.73 15 
Consideration 0.16 21 4.96 20 5.48 25 0.14 23 6.50 26 6.28 25 0.11 21 5.86 22 5.29 16 0.15 23 4.79 13 4.96 18 
EVA 0.20 18 4.56 16 4.75 19 0.16 20 5.00 15 5.42 20 0.16 17 5.30 19 5.60 20 0.22 16 5.53 24 5.88 25 
Likeability 0.24 8 4.55 15 4.13 11 0.26 13 4.76 11 4.75 8 0.25 10 4.81 15 4.56 9 0.30 8 4.33 7 3.95 3 
Loyalty 0.30 3 4.00 10 4.42 13 0.31 4 5.36 17 5.14 15 0.34 4 4.95 17 5.59 19 0.35 4 4.34 8 4.72 13 
Market Share 0.23 10 5.00 22 4.46 15 0.27 11 4.72 8 4.86 9 0.25 10 3.81 3 3.63 3 0.30 9 5.09 18 4.72 14 
Net Profit 0.26 5 3.66 5 3.17 2 0.28 9 4.13 3 4.62 6 0.45 1 2.93 1 2.97 1 0.42 1 4.14 5 3.78 2 
Net Prom Score 0.15 23 3.65 4 3.83 7 0.13 24 6.29 25 6.49 26 0.05 25 9.33 26 8.00 26 0.09 25 4.35 9 4.71 12 
NPV 0.15 23 4.35 12 4.43 14 0.12 25 4.73 9 5.27 18 0.23 12 4.47 12 4.60 10 0.17 20 3.59 2 4.44 9 
Preference 0.16 20 4.69 19 4.85 20 0.22 15 6.00 22 6.03 24 0.27 9 4.29 9 4.94 14 0.17 19 3.61 3 4.21 5 
Quality 0.23 13 5.14 24 5.44 24 0.19 16 6.02 23 5.74 22 0.16 17 8.40 25 6.50 24 0.31 5 3.53 1 4.22 6 
Retention 0.28 4 3.80 7 3.91 9 0.27 12 5.11 16 4.88 10 0.22 13 6.21 24 5.14 15 0.19 18 5.78 26 5.51 22 
ROI 0.23 10 4.54 14 3.73 5 0.34 1 3.63 2 3.47 1 0.34 4 3.77 2 3.32 2 0.37 3 3.82 4 3.30 1 
ROMI 0.25 7 4.10 11 3.67 4 0.28 8 3.62 1 3.65 2 0.14 19 4.22 8 4.89 13 0.31 5 5.40 21 4.68 11 
ROS 0.20 19 3.39 2 3.58 3 0.28 9 4.45 4 4.16 3 0.38 2 4.00 5 3.63 3 0.26 10 5.10 19 4.47 10 
Satisfaction 0.32 2 3.73 6 4.27 12 0.34 2 4.52 5 4.67 7 0.38 2 3.92 4 4.38 7 0.37 2 4.17 6 4.33 7 
Segment Profit 0.24 8 5.37 25 5.13 23 0.19 18 6.06 24 5.23 17 0.13 20 4.38 10 5.50 18 0.22 17 4.95 17 5.29 20 
Share of Voice 0.15 22 5.50 26 5.71 26 0.19 16 4.75 10 5.08 12 0.09 23 5.33 20 5.83 22 0.16 21 4.84 14 5.65 23 
Share of Wallet 0.21 16 5.00 22 4.73 18 0.16 20 5.60 20 5.53 21 0.09 23 4.50 13 3.67 5 0.13 24 5.40 21 6.48 26 
Stocks 0.14 25 3.59 3 3.77 6 0.15 22 5.39 18 4.59 5 0.11 21 6.00 23 5.71 21 0.15 22 4.72 12 4.03 4 
Target Volume 0.23 13 4.47 13 4.97 21 0.31 5 5.41 19 5.38 19 0.31 6 4.20 7 3.70 6 0.31 5 4.50 10 4.33 7 
Tobin’s Q 0.06 26 2.60 1 2.50 1 0.11 26 4.61 7 5.19 16 0.05 25 5.00 18 6.67 25 0.06 26 5.64 25 5.73 24 








Table 3. Continued 
Type of 
Decision Pricing Traditional Advertising Trade Promotions Overall 
Type of Task BYO Internal External BYO Internal External BYO Internal External BYO Internal External 
Metric % Rank Ave Rank Ave Rank % Rank Ave Rank Ave Rank % Rank Ave Rank Ave Rank % Rank Ave Rank Ave Rank 
Acquisition Cost 0.29 5 3.59 3 3.82 3 0.20 14 4.93 19 3.98 5 0.16 20 5.13 21 4.56 20 0.24 13 4.65 12 4.52 8 
Awareness 0.19 14 4.80 15 5.52 25 0.26 11 4.94 20 4.58 13 0.22 6 3.55 5 3.95 12 0.26 10 4.70 14 4.80 14 
Brand. Expend. 0.17 19 5.57 24 5.09 19 0.18 18 4.33 9 4.64 14 0.23 3 4.17 13 3.91 11 0.22 15 4.79 17 4.85 17 
CLV 0.24 11 5.03 20 5.25 21 0.17 19 5.09 22 4.69 16 0.17 17 3.35 4 4.47 17 0.21 16 4.76 16 4.94 19 
Consideration 0.10 25 4.62 13 5.38 23 0.13 22 5.19 25 5.00 21 0.12 25 5.67 25 5.17 24 0.13 24 5.44 26 5.47 26 
EVA 0.19 13 4.19 8 4.54 14 0.19 15 4.92 18 4.92 20 0.22 6 3.86 9 3.73 6 0.19 18 4.83 18 5.05 22 
Likeability 0.26 8 5.14 22 4.94 17 0.29 6 4.22 6 3.91 3 0.21 12 4.33 15 3.81 7 0.26 8 4.56 8 4.30 5 
Loyalty 0.19 14 4.96 18 5.36 22 0.32 3 4.02 4 4.70 17 0.22 6 4.64 19 4.50 18 0.30 4 4.60 11 4.87 18 
Market Share 0.25 10 4.36 11 3.97 7 0.30 5 4.30 8 4.57 12 0.14 23 2.79 2 2.86 1 0.26 10 4.56 7 4.46 7 
Net Profit 0.40 1 2.76 1 2.65 1 0.32 3 3.80 2 3.97 4 0.17 17 5.47 24 4.94 22 0.32 3 3.78 2 3.74 2 
Net Prom Score 0.10 23 5.07 21 5.00 18 0.15 20 5.58 26 5.42 25 0.18 16 4.61 18 4.89 21 0.13 25 5.20 25 5.28 24 
NPV 0.13 21 5.41 23 4.47 13 0.13 22 4.96 21 4.12 6 0.12 25 5.17 22 4.25 15 0.14 23 4.56 9 4.56 10 
Preference 0.13 21 4.94 16 5.12 20 0.18 16 4.43 11 4.22 8 0.21 12 4.86 20 4.38 16 0.19 19 4.86 19 4.97 20 
Quality 0.20 12 3.74 4 3.89 4 0.25 12 3.90 3 4.18 7 0.29 1 4.18 14 3.89 8 0.24 14 4.59 10 4.70 11 
Retention 0.27 7 4.94 17 4.42 12 0.27 10 4.49 13 4.78 18 0.15 21 6.07 26 6.00 26 0.25 12 4.95 22 4.80 15 
ROI 0.33 3 3.43 2 3.61 2 0.41 1 3.50 1 3.40 1 0.22 6 4.00 12 3.91 9 0.33 2 3.73 1 3.48 1 
ROMI 0.18 16 5.58 25 4.17 8 0.29 6 4.41 10 4.26 9 0.28 2 2.59 1 3.15 2 0.26 9 4.28 4 4.02 4 
ROS 0.28 6 3.92 6 3.95 6 0.29 6 4.47 12 3.81 2 0.22 6 3.95 11 3.55 3 0.27 7 4.32 5 3.97 3 
Satisfaction 0.37 2 4.29 10 4.33 10 0.36 2 4.29 7 4.49 10 0.23 3 3.78 7 3.70 5 0.34 1 4.19 3 4.40 6 
Segment Profit 0.18 16 4.54 12 4.21 9 0.15 20 4.58 14 5.58 26 0.22 6 3.82 8 3.91 9 0.19 17 5.06 24 5.04 21 
Share of Voice 0.10 23 6.71 26 5.50 24 0.12 24 5.16 23 4.68 15 0.17 17 3.29 3 4.18 14 0.15 22 4.97 23 5.18 23 
Share of Wallet 0.16 20 5.00 19 6.14 26 0.12 24 4.12 5 5.00 21 0.20 14 3.95 10 4.50 18 0.15 20 4.94 20 5.33 25 
Stocks 0.18 16 4.79 14 4.58 15 0.18 16 5.19 24 4.84 19 0.14 23 5.36 23 5.14 23 0.15 20 4.95 21 4.53 9 
Target Volume 0.26 8 3.94 7 3.94 5 0.24 13 4.69 16 4.52 11 0.23 3 4.52 17 5.48 25 0.27 6 4.70 13 4.73 12 
Tobin’s Q 0.07 26 3.90 5 4.40 11 0.09 26 4.89 17 5.17 23 0.15 21 4.40 16 4.07 13 0.09 26 4.48 6 4.77 13 






Table 4.  Main Effects for Metric and Decision and their Two Way Interactions    
 
 
The grand mean is -0.00002 in the cell of the first row and column.  The main effects for metrics 
is in the first column; the main effects for decisions are in the first row; and the interactions are 








Promo Pricing NPD Distribution
Main Effect Decision 0.000 0.015 -0.005 0.021 0.036 -0.019 0.010 -0.059
Tobin’s Q -1.238 0.140 0.104 -0.173 0.307 -0.057 -0.148 -0.173
Consideration -0.642 0.037 -0.006 0.102 -0.056 -0.149 0.085 -0.013
Net Promo Score -0.518 0.226 -0.035 0.233 0.281 -0.004 -0.076 -0.625
NPV -0.510 -0.116 -0.148 -0.001 -0.107 -0.142 0.090 0.424
Preference -0.462 -0.013 -0.044 -0.122 0.033 -0.183 -0.013 0.343
Stocks -0.449 0.061 -0.064 -0.001 -0.106 0.188 0.024 -0.102
Share of Voice -0.411 -0.032 0.197 -0.056 0.313 -0.206 0.005 -0.222
Share of Wallet -0.374 -0.110 0.002 0.171 0.148 0.055 -0.212 -0.054
CLV -0.028 -0.124 -0.139 0.195 -0.110 0.120 0.032 0.027
EVA 0.023 -0.002 -0.151 -0.036 0.124 0.192 -0.035 -0.093
Segment Profit 0.024 -0.145 -0.022 0.086 0.171 0.073 0.023 -0.186
Quality 0.096 0.094 -0.193 -0.043 0.200 0.106 0.190 -0.354
Branding Expend 0.114 -0.103 0.086 -0.004 0.117 -0.118 0.006 0.016
Likeability 0.121 0.076 -0.051 -0.059 -0.123 -0.015 0.076 0.096
Acquisition Cost 0.141 -0.105 0.122 -0.074 -0.143 0.218 0.026 -0.044
Awareness 0.189 -0.040 0.106 0.063 0.027 -0.191 -0.051 0.088
ROMI 0.229 0.035 0.209 0.053 0.245 -0.197 -0.016 -0.329
Retention 0.235 0.029 0.080 0.189 -0.162 0.101 -0.132 -0.104
ROI 0.272 0.150 0.056 -0.194 -0.160 0.005 0.069 0.074
Loyalty 0.340 0.065 -0.011 0.032 -0.063 -0.194 0.040 0.130
Market Share 0.347 0.091 0.017 -0.120 -0.153 0.054 -0.023 0.134
Net Profit 0.404 -0.058 -0.098 -0.117 -0.453 0.239 0.166 0.321
Target Volume 0.455 -0.101 -0.013 -0.122 -0.122 0.045 0.059 0.253
ROS 0.491 -0.007 0.004 -0.125 -0.025 0.036 -0.140 0.256
Total Customers 0.515 -0.060 -0.001 0.181 -0.072 -0.010 -0.084 0.046





Table 5.  Covariates in Latent Utilities  












































Net Profit .08 .00 -.02 .03 .08 .15 .01 -.06 -.07 .11 .14 .24 -.21 -.30 -.40 .04 .01 .05 -.15 -.24 -.24 
ROI .20 .20 .38 .00 -.08 -.01 -.12 -.36 -.28 .02 -.06 -.10 -.24 -.31 -.45 .04 .16 -.02 -.16 -.18 -.28 
ROS .33 .41 .42 -.08 -.14 -.15 -.04 -.09 -.05 .12 .11 .11 -.19 -.12 -.20 .07 .07 .07 -.05 -.06 -.14 
ROMI .16 .21 .17 -.04 -.10 -.11 .08 .00 .08 .18 .22 .20 -.23 -.08 -.21 -.01 -.01 -.06 -.11 -.10 -.11 
NPV .19 .11 .17 .02 -.05 -.01 -.20 -.53 -.64 .04 -.01 -.01 -.09 -.01 .14 .15 .44 .40 .00 .09 .13 
EVA .15 -.12 -.05 -.11 -.10 -.22 .07 .21 .24 -.06 -.25 -.27 -.13 -.15 -.10 .23 .35 .41 -.04 .00 -.02 
Branding Expen .22 .33 .29 -.13 -.20 -.24 .13 .17 .24 .09 .09 .10 -.23 -.22 -.39 .04 .03 .00 -.11 -.12 -.15 
Stocks .01 -.19 -.23 .06 .18 .15 .07 .04 .08 .06 -.06 -.04 .07 .39 .35 -.15 -.40 -.32 .14 .47 .45 
Tobin’s Q -.42 -1.17 -1.18 .36 .71 .73 -.04 -.13 -.13 -.19 -.45 -.54 .31 .59 .57 -.11 -.25 -.09 .28 .75 .70 
Target Volume .09 -.04 -.09 .00 .03 .03 .11 .14 .12 .04 -.02 -.04 -.35 -.36 -.29 -.03 -.08 -.02 .05 .12 .08 
Acquisition Cost .09 -.07 -.05 .01 .01 .10 .08 .04 .08 .02 -.05 -.09 -.22 -.33 -.23 .00 .00 -.04 -.14 -.17 -.20 
Segment Profit .26 .19 .17 -.09 -.11 -.06 .15 .25 .10 .05 .07 .02 -.20 -.14 -.17 -.09 -.25 -.18 -.04 .03 .04 
CLV .17 .05 .04 -.13 -.14 -.23 .08 .06 .00 .10 .10 .11 -.07 .16 .18 .08 .08 .13 .00 .12 .11 
Market Share .11 -.03 -.03 -.04 -.06 .03 .12 .20 .18 .06 .03 .04 -.07 .09 .09 -.09 -.15 -.25 .00 .12 .10 
Awareness .10 -.09 -.07 .04 .14 .17 .02 -.06 -.08 .07 -.01 -.06 -.11 -.07 .15 .08 .10 .06 -.18 -.23 -.18 
Satisfaction .15 .09 .04 -.08 -.02 -.04 .07 .11 .04 .03 .02 .05 -.19 -.13 -.12 .15 .07 .11 -.14 -.07 -.03 
Likeability -.09 -.24 -.26 -.04 .05 .01 .00 -.11 -.07 .01 -.09 -.06 -.08 .12 .22 .12 .15 .12 .12 .25 .29 
Preference -.10 -.37 -.41 -.13 -.17 -.16 .00 .02 .02 -.09 -.26 -.25 .23 .63 .63 .21 .26 .26 -.03 -.01 .03 
Net Promo Score .04 -.20 -.15 .08 .22 .21 .04 .00 -.08 .02 -.09 -.08 -.11 -.27 -.10 -.10 -.35 -.24 .09 .32 .27 
Loyalty .10 -.03 -.08 -.08 -.11 -.08 .03 .05 .05 .03 -.05 -.01 -.02 .25 .13 .06 .01 .00 .00 .06 .12 
Quality .25 .38 .30 -.11 -.08 -.14 -.07 -.17 -.17 .04 .08 .07 -.24 -.26 -.26 .18 .19 .23 -.06 -.07 .04 
Consideration .09 -.08 -.14 .08 .17 .26 .06 .11 -.13 .02 -.16 -.11 .07 .45 .50 -.12 -.31 -.24 .08 .30 .35 
Total Customers .05 -.04 -.02 -.09 -.07 -.14 .11 .04 .06 .10 .10 .05 -.28 -.26 -.27 .03 .08 .08 -.18 -.22 -.20 
Retention .18 .05 .04 -.08 -.08 -.14 -.03 -.12 -.07 .13 .18 .17 -.12 -.14 -.03 -.05 -.08 -.09 -.08 .00 -.01 
Share of Wallet .15 .00 .08 .14 .26 .20 .02 .03 -.10 .13 .17 .14 .10 .47 .35 -.06 -.18 -.01 .06 .29 .28 
Share of Voice .01 -.12 -.16 -.03 .10 .00 .20 .35 .48 .01 -.07 -.03 -.21 -.11 -.06 -.05 -.27 -.23 -.03 .01 .00 
 

















































Net Profit -.01 -.07 -.13 .11 .17 .32 .05 -.01 .02 .01 -.01 .03 -.05 -.12 -.08 -.02 -.11 -.20 -.04 -.15 -.23 
ROI .02 -.02 -.01 .32 .61 .69 .37 .71 .69 -.06 -.11 -.15 -.01 .00 .09 .02 -.13 -.01 -.04 -.11 -.07 
ROS .06 .02 .06 -.06 -.07 -.07 -.24 -.56 -.42 .05 .06 .07 -.10 -.12 -.12 .13 .16 .15 -.13 -.22 -.27 
ROMI .13 .15 .14 -.02 -.18 -.05 .15 .10 .12 .02 .06 .00 -.04 -.10 -.05 .00 -.05 -.03 -.01 -.03 -.09 
NPV .05 .05 .09 -.23 -.43 -.47 .02 -.10 -.17 -.03 -.11 -.13 -.09 -.19 -.17 .14 .18 .20 .12 .21 .23 
EVA .05 -.02 -.02 -.21 -.24 -.38 -.11 -.28 -.23 -.07 -.21 -.18 .00 .07 .01 .18 .19 .13 .03 .16 .09 
Branding Expen .07 .05 .05 .08 .01 .03 .12 .06 -.09 -.02 .00 .01 -.05 -.01 -.04 -.04 -.17 -.09 -.18 -.29 -.34 
Stocks .01 -.02 -.01 -.21 -.53 -.53 -.07 -.24 -.29 .03 .13 .13 .05 .17 .12 .04 .02 -.04 -.14 -.32 -.36 
Tobin’s Q -.05 -.17 -.22 -.39 -.86 -.95 .00 -.43 -.37 -.15 -.17 -.21 -.07 -.14 -.16 .15 .11 .20 .34 .75 .65 
Target Volume .07 .06 .08 .26 .30 .15 -.04 -.29 -.31 .07 .13 .11 -.03 .03 .00 .20 .27 .22 -.04 .02 -.03 
Acquisition Cost .13 .11 .14 .15 .08 .17 .21 .23 .21 .08 .08 .19 -.03 -.11 -.07 -.18 -.43 -.45 .07 .26 .31 
Segment Profit .07 .07 .05 -.23 -.59 -.58 .03 -.23 -.20 .01 -.10 -.11 .06 .12 .10 .13 .08 .20 .00 .02 .07 
CLV .06 .11 .14 -.02 -.11 -.23 .04 -.03 -.07 -.03 -.12 -.13 -.05 -.08 -.10 .13 .05 .08 .01 .07 .04 
Market Share .04 -.05 -.01 .04 -.02 .05 .11 .11 .14 -.03 .00 .00 -.12 -.18 -.20 .01 -.06 -.01 -.11 -.21 -.25 
Awareness -.02 -.07 -.05 .00 .00 -.02 .09 -.01 .09 .01 -.03 -.02 -.04 .01 .00 .02 .13 .07 .05 .06 .20 
Satisfaction .03 -.01 -.04 .25 .26 .28 .00 -.18 -.13 .08 .11 .12 .03 .13 .05 .05 -.05 -.02 -.13 -.24 -.15 
Likeability -.01 -.08 -.11 .00 -.02 -.05 .09 .05 .15 -.04 -.02 -.06 .00 -.01 .03 .11 .13 .14 .00 -.11 -.12 
Preference .10 .10 .06 .03 .09 .14 .15 .15 .21 -.04 -.02 -.03 -.04 -.01 .01 .15 .15 .09 -.05 .02 .04 
Net Promo Score -.04 -.10 -.10 -.34 -.71 -.76 .26 .38 .37 -.09 -.09 -.07 .07 .24 .18 -.08 -.23 -.16 .08 -.04 -.03 
Loyalty .07 .02 .04 .13 .12 .19 .21 .28 .24 .12 .21 .14 .02 .11 .08 .07 .01 -.15 -.10 -.14 -.14 
Quality .17 .28 .21 .12 .08 .12 -.03 -.13 -.05 -.03 -.07 -.06 -.05 -.04 -.01 .33 .47 .34 .02 .00 .11 
Consideration -.01 -.10 -.06 -.30 -.60 -.62 -.11 -.44 -.43 .00 -.02 .01 -.01 .07 .05 .26 .29 .40 .07 .08 .10 
Total Customers .08 .02 .08 .07 .09 -.01 .01 .02 -.07 .02 .02 .06 -.03 .02 .01 -.03 -.11 -.08 -.05 -.02 -.10 
Retention -.04 -.08 -.13 .06 .10 .15 .04 -.01 -.03 -.07 -.08 -.07 .04 .10 .12 .07 .02 .04 -.05 .01 .03 
Share of Wallet -.07 -.20 -.24 .13 .18 .01 .18 .22 .12 -.01 .08 .02 -.06 -.06 -.13 -.04 -.27 -.10 -.09 -.25 -.29 
Share of Voice .11 .07 .02 -.07 -.28 -.27 .03 .00 -.04 .07 .16 .18 .00 .03 .08 .10 .09 -.02 -.12 -.16 -.07 
 






Appendix Table 1. Variables, Operationalization, and Descriptive Statistics  
Variable 
(source) 








Please rate the level of importance of the following for when you decide 
the usefulness of a metric (1 = not at all important; 7 = extremely 
important) 
 Availability of the metric 
 Reliability of the metric 
 Relevance of the metric 
 Accuracy of the metric 
 Effectiveness of the metric 
 Frequency metric is updated 













How strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the following 
statements (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) 
 Our business objectives are driven primarily by customer 
satisfaction 
 We constantly monitor our level of commitment and orientation to 
serving customer needs 
 We freely communicate information about our successful and 
unsuccessful customer experiences throughout all business functions 
 Our strategy for competitive advantage is based on our 
understanding of customer needs 
 We measure customer satisfaction systematically and frequently 
 We have routine or regular measures for customer service 
 We are more customer focused than our competitors 
 I believe this business exists primarily to serve customers 







How strongly do you agree or disagree with each of the following 
statements about top management in your firm (1 = strongly disagree, 7 
= strongly agree) 
 The functions performed by the marketing department are generally 
considered to be more critical than other functions 
 Marketing tends to dominate other functions in decision-making. 






Please indicate your level of work experience in the following 3 
questions (1 = < 1 year; 2 = 1-5 years; 3 = 6-10 years; 4 = 11-20 years; 5 
= > 20 years) 
 How long have you been at your current position  
 How long have you been with your current employer? 
 How long have you been in your profession? 






Please indicate your job title (0 = lower than VP-level [e.g., Director, 
Manager]; 1 = VP-level or higher [e.g., SVP, C-level or Owner]) 
--- .63 --- 
Marketing 
Responsibility 
Please indicate how involved you are in each of the areas (1 = never 
involved; 7 = always involved) 
 Marketing budget 
 Financial reporting 
 Contact with customers 
 Contact with marketing vendors 





Please indicate the level of performance of your firm relative to your 
firm’s stated objectives (1 = much worse, 7 = much better) 
 How was the overall performance of your firm in the last 3 years? 
 How was the overall performance of your firm relative to your 
closest competitors in the last 3 years? 















Please indicate the level of performance of your overall marketing 
relative to your firm’s stated objectives (1 = much worse, 7 = much 
better) 
 How is your overall marketing performing this year?   
 How is your overall marketing performing on financial measures 
(i.e., profitability, sales, ROI, etc.) this year? 
 How is your overall marketing performing on non-financial 
measures (i.e., customer satisfaction, customer loyalty, market share, 
etc.) this year?   






Approximately what percentage of sales does the largest 4 competing 
businesses in your market control? (0 = 0-50%, 1 = 51-100%) 






At which one of the following stages would you place your product?  
(0 = Introduction & Growth; 1 = Mature & Decline) 
 
 
--- .40 --- 





Please indicate the extent to which your sales come from B2B or B2C 
markets (1 = mostly B2B, 7 = mostly B2C) 







Please indicate the extent to which your sales come from goods or 
services markets (1 = mostly goods, 7 = mostly services) 
--- 4.44 1.96 
Small-Size 
Firm 
Does your firm employ less than 250 employees? --- .25 --- 
Mid-Size 
Firm 
Does your firm employ between 250-990 employees? --- .44 --- 
Large-Size 
Firm 







Appendix Table 2.  Root Mean Square Error among the Estimated Intercepts and Scaled 
Effects for Different Identification Constraints in the Ordinal Probit Model   
 
The scaled effects subtract the overall mean and divide by the error standard deviation.  The 
















1 -3 & 3 2 1 & 10 92.80 1.418 0.102 
1 -3 & 3 3 1 & 100 97.20 3.383 0.095 
1 -3 & 3 4 0 & 1 50.82 0.510 0.251 
2 1 & 10 3 1 & 100 92.71 2.513 0.183 
2 1 & 10 4 0 & 1 84.11 1.477 0.235 
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